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1 Introduction
Being able to correctly aggregate the beliefs of many people into a single belief is a problem
fundamental to many important social, economic and political processes such as policy
making, market pricing and voting. Although there exist many models and mechanisms
for aggregation, there is a lack of methods and literature regarding the aggregation of
opinions when influence and learning between individuals exist. This is in part because
there are not many models of how people update their belief when exposed to the beliefs
of others, and so it is hard to quantify the dependencies between people's mental models
which is essential to minimizing redundancies in the aggregation. In this paper, we explore
many models of how users influence and learn from each other, and we benchmark our
models against the well-known DeGroot model [1]. Our main contributions are: 1) we
collect a new dataset of unprecedented size and detail to be posted online; 2) we develop
a new Social Bayesian model of how people update their mental models, 3) we compare
of our model to other well-known social learning models. Specifically, we show that our
new Social Bayesian model is superior to the other models tested.
2 Literature Review
There is evidence showing that individuals do not always give their best guess when
answering a question, but instead sample from an internal distribution [8, 5], which ex-
plains why asking the same question multiple times improves guesses. The problem of
aggregation then becomes an exercise of combining people's individual distributions into
a group distribution. Although there is an extensive literature on how to combine distri-
butions [6, 3, 7], there is limited work on how to combine such distributions when there
is influence and learning between individuals. This is an important distinction because if
people have correlated beliefs, the aggregation over distributions should incorporate the
decrease in entropy that occurs from having shared beliefs compared to the ideal (and
often assumed) case when people have independent beliefs. We build on the work of [2, 4]
to model the individual cognitive process of individuals as they update their beliefs after
being exposed to social information. These individual distributions could then be used
to calculate inter-individual correlations in beliefs, which can then be used to aggregate
with correlation. In this paper, we focus on how to estimate people's individual belief
distribution.
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3 Data
Over the span of 6 months, we ran 7 sequential and independent Wisdom of the Crowd
(WoC) rounds of 2037 students (from several online classes) making 17420 price predic-
tions of real financial assets (e.g. the S&P 500) over a period for 3 weeks each round.
We collaborated with the crowdsourced stock rating website Vetr.com and designed the
prediction process as follows: students go to our page and make a (pre-social) prediction
of an instrument's price, then they are showed a histogram of their peer's predictions
after which they make another (post-social) prediction. They have to provide confidence
ratings and answers to surveys relating to their past experience in finance. Because the
students are from a class, we also have their demographics, grades, and discussion fo-
rum data. Interestingly, we also have two rounds of prediction that happened during
extraordinary market environments: the Brexit vote and Trump's election.
4 Analysis & Results
Our new Social Bayesian model is based on the fact that we know each student's pre-
social and post-social predictions, and the exact histogram (of their peers' predictions)
they are exposed to. This model updates individual belief about the price of an asset
using social information as follows:
P (post|SI, prior) = P (SI, prior|post)P (post)
P (SI, prior)
=
P (SI|post)P (prior|post)P (post)
P (SI, prior)
=
P (post|SI)P (SI)
P (post)
P (post|prior)P (prior)
P (post)
P (post)
P (SI, prior)
=
P (post|SI)P (SI)P (post|prior)P (prior)
P (post)P (SI, prior)
= κ
P (post|SI)P (post|prior)
P (post)
where κ is a constant, κ = P (SI)P (prior)
P (prior,SI)
, because all terms in κ are constant and
known given prior and SI. post is the post-social prediction, prior is the pre-social
prediction and SI is the mean of the social information. We only use Bayes theorem in this
derivation. The only assumption we make (between the first and second step) is that SI
and prior are conditionally independent on post. Because there are potential exogenous
and indirect dependencies, we test the fit of our model under this assumption. We do so
by numerically calculating the joint distributions: we first construct distributions from
point estimates (each person's predictions) and we then discretize the distributions into
several bins. We then calculate the Mean Absolute Error of how our model's post-
social prediction compares to the individual's actual post-social prediction. As we can
see in Table 1, our Social Bayesian model outperforms the DeGroot model baseline.
Additionally, we test our models against another class of models we built which are
loosely Naive Bayesian [9] (because the likelihood is assumed to be the social information
seen by a user) using 1) the mean or mode of the posterior distribution for the post-social
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Table 1: Model Comparison (all values are percentages)
Mean Absolute Error over Rounds
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Normal Approx. 2.79 6.03 2.21 2.10 1.42 2.73 2.75
Em_Mean_Norm 3.37 7.31 2.63 2.61 1.79 3.48 3.51
Em_Mean_Uni 3.94 7.39 2.87 2.41 1.79 3.04 3.49
Em_Mode_Norm 3.38 7.40 2.61 2.62 1.79 3.48 3.48
Em_Mode_Uni 3.30 6.62 2.49 2.51 1.60 2.89 3.37
DeGroot 2.51 5.27 1.94 1.86 1.24 2.62 2.29
Prob. Learning 2.05 5.23 1.97 1.69 1.21 2.47 2.32
Social Bayesian 1.52 5.13 1.92 0.82 0.63 1.28 0.86
Improvement 54.2 10.5 2.0 87.7 58.9 122.3 147.1
prediction, 2) either an assumed normal or an empirical distribution for the likelihood
(social histogram), and 3) either a normal or uniform distribution for the prior. Finally,
we also try a simple probabilistic learning model where P (post) = P (SI ∩ prior) =
P (SI) ∗ P (prior).
As we can see in Figure 1, our newly developed Social Bayesian learning model clearly
outperforms all the empirical models used in the literature in all rounds. We improve
54.2%, 10.5%, 2.0%, 87.7%, 58.9%, 122.3% and 147.1% over the best base models. The
improvement is calculated using improv = errorbaseline−errornew
1−errorbaseline . This indicates that our
Social Bayesian model is a better approximation to how people update their belief when
exposed to the beliefs of others.
Figure 1: Mean Absolute Error for Social
Bayesian model vs. next best model
Because we now also have an accurate
representation of people's belief (as op-
posed to the usual single point-estimates
in WoC contexts), we could also estimate
the correlations between each user's belief
distribution using, for example, the Kull-
backLeibler divergence. Using such mea-
sures of dependence, one could improve the
WoC through a variety of means because
one could now find users with beliefs that
are too similar to each other (e.g. to re-
duce redudancy), or to find outliers who
have very different beliefs (e.g. to remove
inacurrate predictors).
Thus, our Social Bayesian formuation
not only outperforms other models from
literature, but it also allows us to construct
a representation that can be used to calcu-
late useful inter-individual correlations for
improved aggregation.
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